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This paper considers the Government’s proposals for reforming the budgetary 
process from the perspective of its impact on the Finance Bill and the 
development of tax legislation. The paper is divided into three parts. First, it 
summarises briefly what the White Paper has to say on the subject of the Budget 
tax proposals, the Finance Bill and tax administration. Thereafter, it considers 
the implications that a change to a December Budget will have on the Finance 
Bill process. Finally, the paper looks at possible ways of reforming the system by 
which tax legislation is developed and enacted. 
The paper does not deal with the particular problems of the transitional year 
1993 in which there will be both a spring and a winter Budget. The Government 
presently has outstanding proposals for reforming the taxation of the self-
employed, trusts, company cars, financial instruments and foreign exchange 
gains and losses. With a major decision on the valuation of benefits in kind for 
tax purposes anticipated any time from the Judicial Committee of the House of 
Lords,
1 there should be more than enough to deal with in the two 1993 Budgets. 
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II. THE WHITE PAPER
2 
It is sometimes suggested that any government Green or White Paper which 
exceeds 100 pages should be ignored because clearly nothing is intended to 
result from it. If that is the criterion for judging such things, the Government’s 
White Paper on Budgetary Reform, at a mere seven pages, is desperately serious 
stuff. Sir Humphrey Appleby, in Yes Minister, expressed a slightly different view 
of the significance of a government White Paper. In relation to Jim Hacker’s 
proposal to honour a manifesto pledge for more open government, Sir Humphrey 
explained to Hacker’s Private Secretary, Bernard Woolley, that the resulting 
White Paper would be called Open Government because “you always dispose of 
the difficult bit in the title. It does less harm there than on the statute book’ 
(Lynn and Jay, 1981). 
The White Paper on Budgetary Reform explains that from December 1993 a 
single Budget in that month will bring together the Government’s tax plans for 
the coming year and its spending plans for the next three years. The Finance Bill 
will be published soon after the Christmas Recess and parliamentary 
consideration of the Bill will begin late in January. The rest of the timetable will 
be brought forward from its current March to August time frame. On that basis, 
Royal Assent to the Bill will be required by 5 May. It is assumed for the 
purposes of this paper that the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act (‘PCTA’) 
will be amended accordingly. 
A number of advantages stemming from this change are put forward by the 
White Paper. First, it notes that under the present budgetary timetable, revenue 
and expenditure are brought together in the Financial Statement and Budget 
Report which is published at the time of the spring Budget. However, the focus 
at that time is on the tax proposals, and their link with the previously announced 
spending proposals is easily overlooked. If the new timetable serves to reduce 
the importance that is currently accorded to detailed changes in tax legislation, 
then that may be a step in the right direction. The need for a Chancellor to turn in 
a good performance in the parliamentary theatre on Budget Day with something 
that can be characterised by the Press as a ‘Budget for Business’ or a ‘Budget for 
Savers’ may well have added to the pressure to produce a package of tinkering 
tax changes that have produced little measurable benefit. If that can be avoided, 
so much the better. 
Second, the White Paper suggests that the earlier announcement of tax 
proposals should help taxpayers to plan their own affairs and reduce the 
administrative burden on employers in implementing tax and National Insurance 
changes. The Government’s views as to how taxpayers should plan their tax 
affairs may not necessarily coincide with taxpayers’ own ideas! The White Paper 
                                                                                                                                    
Hansard Rule in the case and whether the taxpayer is entitled to refer to certain ministerial statements on the 
meaning of the legislation at the time of its enactment. 
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notes that earlier publication and completion of the Finance Bill will mean that 
taxpayers and practitioners will be aware of the precise form of tax changes 
before they take effect. While that may be an advantage in some cases, it may, 
overall, be a marginal one. Under the present timetable the final form of the 
Finance Bill proposals is usually known by June and proposals introduced at a 
late stage to the Bill often only apply from the date of introduction. Other 
changes may only take effect from Royal Assent in any event. 
In addition, where there is scope for creative tax planning as a result of tax 
proposals, the changes often operate from Budget Day or from any earlier 
announcement, as the White Paper recognises. Where that option is not 
available, the Government can at present rely upon the limited available time 
between the Budget and the start of the new tax and financial year and the 
absence of the Finance Bill to restrict the scope for tax planning. Changes can on 
that basis take effect from the beginning of the new tax and financial year. Under 
the new arrangements, even though the January Finance Bill may not have 
received the Royal Assent by April, many of its provisions will effectively be in 
final form before the end of March. Accordingly, it is likely that closer attention 
will be paid to the need for forestalling legislation to limit the scope of interim 
planning, but the need for such legislation should not be overstated. 
Third, income tax and National Insurance decisions are presently taken at 
different times. They will now be brought together so that they are implemented 
at the same time in April. This should bring administrative benefits for 
employers but if it also represents a further small step towards the eventual 
alignment (if not formal integration) of income tax and National Insurance rules, 
this is likely to be welcomed by many employers. 
Finally, however, the clearest benefit of the change will be the ability to 
merge two PAYE recoding exercises into one. At present, new PAYE codes are 
issued in January based on existing tax rates and allowances and are then 
amended after the spring Budget so that the budget changes only take effect in 
the first pay packet after 17 May, backdated to 6 April. There will now be one 
recoding exercise, to take effect from 6 April — unless there is a change in tax 
rates or allowances during the passage of the Finance Bill. The Inland Revenue 
has issued a consultative document on the impact of this change on employers’ 
payroll systems to which the Institute of Taxation and other bodies have 
responded.
3 The Institute has expressed concern that while the change offers the 
opportunity for simplification and a saving in costs for the Inland Revenue, some 
of the detail of the new procedures may impose additional compliance costs on 
employers, in particular the need to distinguish the source of the code — 
whether obtained from the inspector, via a general uplifting or from Form P45. 
These problems may, however, be resolved through the ongoing consultations 
with the Inland Revenue. 
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III. THE FINANCE BILL 
If these are some of the advantages to be gained from a change to a December 
Budget, what then are the implications for the Finance Bill? This is the subject 
of a paper submitted to the Government by the Special Committee of Tax Law 
Consultative Bodies, of which the Institute of Taxation is a member body.
4 The 
White Paper anticipates that the Finance Bill will be introduced after the 
Christmas Recess in January and will receive the Royal Assent by early May, as 
compared with the present April to August timetable. In fact, while the PCTA 
presently establishes an August cut-off date for the Bill, in practice there is 
pressure to get the Bill through earlier and Royal Assent more normally is given 
by around 25 or 26 July. 
While nominally the same time will be taken over the Bill under the new 
timetable, a comparison with recent years by the Special Committee has 
suggested that there will in fact be a significant loss in the number of days during 
which the Bill is before the House of Commons. The Special Committee has 
taken the actual budget timetable in each of the years from 1984 to 1991 
(excluding the 1987 Bills which were affected by the election in that year) and, 
working back from the date of the Finance Bill’s Third Reading, has calculated 
how the timetable would have been affected had there been a December rather 
than a March Budget. The results suggest a substantial reduction in the number 
of days in the process between First and Third Readings of the Bill, ranging from 
50 days in 1986 and 1989 to 30 days in 1985. 
At this stage the likely impact on the Finance Bill timetable of a change to a 
December Budget can only be estimated. The possible scale of any such impact 
depends upon what assumptions are made as to the parliamentary timetable 
following the Budget, in particular the date of publication of the Bill and the 
PCTA date. However, if there is to be a May cut-off date under the PCTA (and 
there is no reason why there must be a May date), it seems improbable that, with 
the Christmas and Easter Recesses, there will be more time available. Intuitively, 
it seems likely that there will be less time. A typical year under the existing 
procedure would be for the Bill to be published in mid-April and for the Second 
Reading to be at the end of April. The Committee stage, and detailed 
representations from outside Parliament, would occupy May, June and early July 
— say 72 days. Report and Third Reading would be around 10 and 11 July, with 
the House of Lords and Royal Assent taking another two weeks. 
Under the new procedure, the Bill would be published mid-January after the 
Christmas Recess, with the Second Reading following after the conventional two 
clear weekends. Seventy-two days from the beginning of February places Report 
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and Third Reading around 13 and 14 April, following which the House of Lords 
stage and Royal Assent can be met before 5 May. However, the Easter Recess 
has to be accommodated within this timetable. While the Whit Recess intervenes 
at present in May, it is shorter and at an earlier stage of the process. Under the 
new timetable, there will be inevitable pressure to complete the Committee stage 
before Easter, even if Report is taken thereafter. However, it is the Committee 
stage which least requires to be truncated. 
Calculations based on the date of publication of the Finance Bill between 
1984 and 1991 and the date of the Easter Recess, coupled with an assumption as 
to the likely date of Report and Third Reading, still suggest a reduction in House 
of Commons time of, on average, between 21 and 28 days (or three to four 
weeks) as compared with the Special Committee’s figures of, on average, 41 
days (or nearly six weeks). By any standards, this is a potentially serious loss of 
time that requires the fullest consideration and discussion.
5 
It might be that if there is less legislative time available, there will be less tax 
legislation and that will be for the good. However, in the face of over 3,000 
pages of tax legislation since the present Government took office in 1979, and 
with the various proposals in prospect that have already been mentioned, one 
should be sceptical about such a proposition. 
For many years there has been widespread criticism of the Finance Bill 
procedure and a large number of different proposals have been put forward for 
its reform. The most recent review of the legislative process in general is being 
conducted by the Hansard Society which is due to report in 1993. However, none 
of the previous proposals for reform have suggested that the Finance Bill process 
should actually be shortened. 
IV. THE TAX REFORM PROCESS 
Whatever the length of parliamentary time allowed, to make a final 
judgement on the Finance Bill procedure and timetable requires that it be put in 
the overall context of the process by which specific tax proposals are formulated, 
enacted and put into operation. The Budget, and the Finance Bill that follows it, 
can be regarded as marking the end of the formulation stage for tax proposals 
and the start of the practical implementation stage as the Revenue departments, 
taxpayers and practitioners get down to interpreting and applying the rules that 
government has formulated and Parliament is being called upon to enact. Within 
the overall process there are a number of discernible, if interlinked and 
overlapping stages: 
(1)  policy formulation and evaluation; 
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was no intention on the Government’s part to restrict the time available for the Bill. It is assumed that any 
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(2)  technical appraisal and legislative drafting; 
(3) enactment; 
(4)  post-legislative amendment and refinement; and 
(5)  post-legislative interpretation, application and guidance. 
The satisfactory outcome of the enactment stage depends very largely upon 
how well stages (1) and (2) have proceeded.
6 It also depends upon what is 
regarded as within the enactment stage. In the present context this paper has 
focused on the Finance Bill, but the enactment stage can also include the use of 
secondary and tertiary legislation. 
The process of tax reform has been examined at length elsewhere and is 
outside the scope of this paper.
7 The paper is, therefore, confined to some 
comments as to what needs to be done in the light of the present proposal for a 
December Budget and the Finance Bill that will flow from it. 
There is now extensive pre-Budget consultation on prospective tax changes. 
The success of this process should have a direct impact on the legislation to be 
contained in the Finance Bill. There does, however, need to be a clear 
appreciation as to what consultation is about. In the writer’s view, its purpose is 
to enable government to make better-informed decisions on tax policy matters 
and to improve the quality of the eventual legislation. It is not about consultees 
getting their own way (that is, lobbying) nor, necessarily, about achieving a 
compromise or consensus that just ensures a smoother parliamentary ride but 
fails to achieve any satisfactory fiscal policy objective. This is not to underrate 
the importance of assessing the impact of tax changes or the likely objections to 
them. Ultimately, however, the Budget and Finance Bill procedure should be 
geared to requiring the Government to justify its proposals. They will be the 
better for being formulated against clear and well-researched policy objectives 
rather than some confused consensus. Related to that, the tax policy institutions 
in the UK, in particular those in the Treasury, in the writer’s view, require 
strengthening (see Gammie (1992)). 
Most important, however, whatever the length of the Finance Bill procedure, 
complex tax legislation needs to be exposed in draft for comment before it 
reaches a stage at which it can only be amended in accordance with rigid 
parliamentary procedures. The same is true in many other legislative areas. In 
this respect, the Special Committee has proposed that following a December 
Budget the Finance Bill should be published in draft form in January but only 
presented to Parliament in April, so providing a period during which the 
Government can freely amend its provisions before seeking parliamentary 
approval for its measures. On the basis that tax rates and allowances have been 
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announced in December, the delay in implementing them should not affect the 
administrative gains for PAYE codings, which even on the Government’s own 
timetable for the Bill, assume that those rates and allowances will not change 
after the December Budget. 
Should an election intervene, as occurred in 1992, the Government is 
perfectly able to ensure that a Finance Bill is passed containing its principal 
measures before Parliament is dissolved. In addition, the need for forestalling 
legislation might be more easily assessed over the January to April period. 
Certainly, those who sought to take undue advantage of any proposed changes 
could not do so with the certain knowledge of what final legislation would offer. 
There are a number of variations on this theme that could be pursued. The 
writer has previously suggested (Gammie, 1988 and 1989) that the Finance Bill 
should be split in two, with rates and allowances being dealt with fairly shortly 
and more technical measures being incorporated in another Bill to which more 
time would be given. A split is already made between the clauses taken in 
Committee of the whole House and those taken in Standing Committee. This 
proposal would merely extend that principle by incorporating the two in separate 
Bills and giving more time to the more technical proposals. These suggestions 
were made in relation to the existing timetable and envisaged that the technical 
Bill would not receive the Royal Assent until October. They fit equally well with 
a December Budget, with the short Finance Bill following in January containing 
the main rate and allowance changes and a longer technical Bill being published 
in draft and then enacted between April and July as at present. 
This would mean that there would be a longer lead time between the 
announcement of proposals and their final enactment and sacrifice the advantage 
mentioned in paragraph 22 of the White Paper of reducing the uncertainty of 
amendment after the start of the financial and tax year. However, that uncertainty 
is nothing as compared with the uncertainty of bad legislation, hastily introduced 
as the Bill careers through its short life in Parliament. If a longer procedure 
offers the opportunity for better legislation, any temporary uncertainty is a price 
worth paying for the longer-term certainty that clear and well-drafted provisions 
can bring. 
A difficulty that is sometimes suggested with such proposals is that the 
completion of one set of fiscal measures then encroaches on the Government’s 
preparation for the next set. As the writer has never seen the budget preparation 
process operate from within government, it is difficult to know how much 
credence can, or ought to, be given to this point. It is hard to believe that this is 
more than a matter of organisation and resources which should not be beyond 
our capacity to achieve. The formulation of tax policy and consultation take time 
and are ongoing processes. To believe that they can be neatly divided up into 
annual cycles, one of which is signed off and another then started, is surely 
misconceived and, indeed, does not accord with the current way of doing things. Fiscal Studies 
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In the writer’s view, this is no objection to the extension of the Finance Bill 
process in the ways that have been suggested. 
However long the consultative process, and whatever form it takes, the results 
of that process have to be reflected in the final legislation. In November last year 
the then Financial Secretary announced the Government’s intention to amend the 
group relief rules for losses to reverse a decision of the Court of Appeal. Draft 
legislation was published in January and was subject to substantial comment. 
However, the draft legislation was incorporated in the Finance (No. 2) Act 1992 
with only minor amendments and at the same time the present Financial 
Secretary announced that the Inland Revenue would be reviewing and updating a 
Statement of Practice and Extra-Statutory Concession on the legislation to take 
account of the many representations that had been made on the draft legislation 
Now is not the time to argue the detail of this particularly unsatisfactory 
matter. Explanations have been offered as to why it was dealt with in this way. In 
the writer’s view, those explanations do not withstand critical analysis. To say, 
for example, that many responses, although relevant to the subject matter under 
review, went beyond the legislative change that the Government had in mind is 
merely to shift the criticism from the legislative draftsman to the draftsman of 
his terms of reference. Here, as elsewhere in this year’s Finance Act, to enact 
anti-avoidance provisions in a particular form and then temper them with Extra-
Statutory Concessions or Parliamentary Statements as to how the Revenue will 
apply them is to deprive taxpayers of their normal rights of appeal and to leave 
them at the mercy of administrative discretion. In this area of Revenue practice 
and concession, my researches suggest that by July 1992 there were some 189 
current published Extra-Statutory Concessions as compared with 94 in 1979 and 
62 in 1970. Some 69 of the 1979 concessions are still current in 1992. 
This leads to a final point. Primary legislation is a particularly ineffective 
means of fine-tuning the tax system. It is already extremely difficult to get 
technical amendments to existing legislation into the Finance Bill and this will 
be more difficult still if the current Finance Bill procedures remain the same but 
with even less parliamentary time to complete them. The system works (if that is 
the right word), as the 1936 Income Tax Codification Committee put it, “by 
adding a patch here and there, the Courts interpreting particular provisions, and 
the Inland Revenue Department devising practical expedients’.
8 That result was 
unsatisfactory in 1936 and it is no more satisfactory in 1992. The Institute of 
Chartered Accountants lists some 279 detailed technical anomalies that have 
been outstanding for a number of years. Not all are worthy of implementation 
but the fact that none of them has been implemented is at least a matter of note. 
Solutions to these problems lie in two directions: first, an effective means 
needs to be found that will ensure that primary legislation that is known to be 
defective or out of date can be reviewed and amendments proposed; second, 
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greater use needs to be made of secondary and tertiary legislation to fine-tune the 
legislation and to deal properly with concessions and practices that really should 
now be given a cloak of legislative respectability. It is clear, however, that the 
greater use of secondary and tertiary legislation will not command support until 
satisfactory means are found of scrutinising such legislation. This may seem to 
be an illogical stance given three factors: first, there is already a great deal of 
what many would regard as unscrutinised tertiary legislation in the form of 
Revenue practice statements and concessions; second, in practice, secondary 
legislation can be and is consulted upon outside the time constraints of a Finance 
Bill procedure; and, third, primary legislation receives scant attention at the best 
of times and can be introduced at the final stages of the Finance Bill process — 
as can be seen with so many measures in 1992 — so ensuring no proper scrutiny 
at all. 
Collectively, however, these points merely illustrate the unsatisfactory nature 
of the present system. At quarter-to-three in the morning of 1 July — or 30 June 
in House of Commons terms — the Financial Secretary was driven to remark on 
the subject of equity notes
9 that he 
sought to comment on the way in which the new clause would be interpreted by the 
Revenue in practice. It would be easier if we could define precisely not merely the 
circumstances dreamt up to benefit that arrangement but those that will be in future. The 
need for a flexible basis in the law is underlined by the fact that the hon. Gentleman began 
by saying that we discussed the point two years ago in the context of dual residency, and 
that we are again discussing it within two years in the context of equity notes. We should 
try to avoid entertaining the Committee with this debate on an annual basis. 
Some would argue that the problem and the solution in this area lie more 
appropriately in an examination of the underlying policy rather than in tinkering 
with the detail of the legislation. Too often the easy option is taken of blaming 
tax avoiders for the complexity and unsatisfactory nature of tax legislation. 
However, tax avoidance can be one of the best guides to the deficiencies 
inherent in the tax system because those who seek to avoid tax are by definition 
playing on the system’s weaknesses. While it is often convenient for 
governments and tax authorities to castigate tax avoiders for their activities, we 
might more sensibly seek to identify the weakness in the basic structure of the 
tax system that gave rise to the avoidance in the first place. 
However, whatever the different attitudes to tax avoidance, the solution 
should never lie in enacting unsatisfactory legislation and leaving the Inland 
Revenue to apply it as it thinks fit. One has sympathy for a Financial Secretary 
who has to debate these matters at an early hour of the morning. It brings to mind 
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Sir Geoffrey Howe’s observation — and no paper on this topic would be 
complete without at least one reference to his Addington Society address in 1977 
— that “few people are at their most receptive to the intricacies of sale and 
leaseback provisions explained at 3.30 in the morning’ (Howe, 1977). 
The Armstrong Committee (1980) proposed a Standing Committee to 
examine the operation of existing taxes and propose changes to them, and this 
suggestion, in one form or another, has been made from other quarters.
10 With 
such a Committee there may be scope to look to greater use of secondary and 
tertiary legislation as well as correct the deficiencies in the existing primary 
legislation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The annual nature of such taxes as income tax serves in the UK the essential 
constitutional function of requiring a government to come each year to 
Parliament to renew its revenue-raising powers. By dealing with revenue and 
expenditure plans at the same time, the hope is that the Government’s proposals 
can be presented in a more coherent and consistent way and lead to a better-
informed debate on the choices and trade-offs between public expenditure, 
taxation and borrowing. On the basis that government’s spending plans are rarely 
if ever altered while taxing proposals are occasionally altered, the overall effect 
might in fact be to introduce a greater rigidity on the taxing side. 
However, few of the measures in the Finance Bill relate directly and 
immediately to funding the Government’s current expenditure. More are fiscal 
fine-tuning or longer-term change involving no immediate budgetary cost or, at 
least, a cost that in the overall scheme of the Government’s current expenditure 
is of less significance than its importance to the longer-term structure of the tax 
system. On that basis, there would be good arguments for removing many of the 
technical measures from the budget process altogether and putting them into a 
separate technical Bill. This, however, raises questions of what is technical and 
what is policy and the right way to deal with each. Categorising changes to tax 
legislation has been attempted by many: the Armstrong and Renton 
Committees
11 each looked at this. The issue, however, is not so much a matter of 
categorising the problem as deciding on the solution: do you address tax 
problems by tinkering — a limited amendment or a recasting of provisions — or 
by reforming — asking whether this is the best way of achieving the underlying 
policy? For this reason the Budget and Finance Bill process needs to be put into 
the context of the whole taxing process previously described. 
The White Paper on Budgetary Reform did not set out to tackle these issues 
but it is clear that not only does it offer the opportunity for us to look more 
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closely at what can be done to improve the Finance Bill process, but it may make 
that need more urgent if in fact a likely result of a December Budget is the 
restriction in available time for considering detailed tax measures. No amount of 
parliamentary time will make the technicalities of tax more interesting to 
Members of Parliament. At the same time it will always be impossible for 
primary legislation to encompass all the detail that a tax system requires in the 
modern world. For these reasons we need: 
(1)  a procedure that enables well-considered legislation to be put before 
Parliament for its approval; 
(2)  appropriate ways of dealing with more of the detail outside the procedure 
for primary legislation; and 
(3)  proper methods for reviewing the detail, operation and administration of 
the tax system as a whole. 
Sir Charles Davis drew the Renton Committee’s attention to the fundamental 
distinction between UK and Community law (Renton Committee, 1975, para. 
9.5): 
... [Our legislation] is customarily drafted with almost mathematical precision, the object 
(not always attained) being in effect to provide a complete answer to virtually every 
question that can arise.... With Community law, certainty ... is much less important and the 
main desideratum appears to be the logical formulation of an idea so that the general 
objective of the legislation is never lost sight of.... Essentially, the dilemma seems to me to 
be a choice between two eminently desirable but mutually exclusive objectives namely 
clarity and certainty. 
The writer does not necessarily share his view that clarity and certainty are so 
mutually exclusive. However, the European influence on the UK’s tax system (as 
on its legal system as a whole) is more likely to grow than to diminish. The 
direction set out in (1) and (2) above is consistent with that influence. 
As regards the proposal in (3) above, in the final analysis, what is needed are 
satisfactory ways in which those responsible for shaping our tax system and for 
operating it can be made accountable for the way they approach their 
responsibilities. To return to Yes Minister, Sir Arnold Robinson, Secretary to the 
Cabinet, pointed out to Bernard Woolley that “Open Government is a 
contradiction in terms. You can be open — or you can have government’. The 
idea behind that view applies not just to government but to many other activities. 
If people know what you are doing, you can be called to account for it. 
The possibility of an independent review committee has been suggested by 
many
12 but seems as remote a possibility as ever. Such a committee with real 
powers would, as the Armstrong Committee effectively acknowledged, encroach 
upon the Government’s own prerogative in the taxation field. However, if there 
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is support outside government for such a proposal, perhaps the solution is not to 
wait for government to act but to establish such an independent review 
committee outside government. The proposals by the Legal Risk Review 
Committee for a Financial Law Panel provide an interesting development which 
may provide an appropriate precedent. 
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